Geopolitics in Africa: Analysis for Libya (June '24)
Risk Score: 4
Libya shows more alignment with Russia as evidenced by multiple instances of Russian involvement in military and strategic initiatives, including support of rebel commander Khalifa Haftar1, control of Libya’s Al Jufra Air Base2, and increased influence via the Wagner Group3. This points to a moderate-to-high risk of Libya leaning further towards Russia from its current slightly higher preference.
Libya shows more alignment with Russia as evidenced by multiple instances of Russian involvement in military and strategic initiatives, including support of rebel commander Khalifa Haftar1, control of Libya’s Al Jufra Air Base2, and increased influence via the Wagner Group3. This points to a moderate-to-high risk of Libya leaning further towards Russia from its current slightly higher preference.
1: Around the same time, in 2013, Russia established its Mediterranean Squadron, with its Black Sea Fleet mainly providing the necessary ships and logistics to gain a stronger foothold in the Middle East and North Africa. In 2015, the Russian military intervened in Syria and later began to support rebel commander Khalifa Haftar in the Libyan civil war. Since then, Russia has upgraded its previously modest Tartus naval base in Syria to accommodate larger ships, expanded its Hmeimim Air Base in Syria’s Latakia province and taken control of Libya’s Al Jufra Air Base — an important hub for the Kremlin’s Africa operations. View Source2: Around the same time, in 2013, Russia established its Mediterranean Squadron, with its Black Sea Fleet mainly providing the necessary ships and logistics to gain a stronger foothold in the Middle East and North Africa. In 2015, the Russian military intervened in Syria and later began to support rebel commander Khalifa Haftar in the Libyan civil war. Since then, Russia has upgraded its previously modest Tartus naval base in Syria to accommodate larger ships, expanded its Hmeimim Air Base in Syria’s Latakia province and taken control of Libya’s Al Jufra Air Base — an important hub for the Kremlin’s Africa operations. View Source3: Moscow is expanding its "security for resources" blueprint in Libya under the lead of the new Wagner Group's General Andrei Averyanov. What does this mean for the democratic transition? View Source
Libya's current alignment shows a significant inclination towards Russian interests. Russia has entrenched itself in Libyan affairs through multiple strategic military and economic initiatives. An important development was in 2015 when Russia began supporting rebel commander Khalifa Haftar in the Libyan civil war and further amplified its presence by taking over Libya’s Al Jufra Air Base4. This bolstered its logistical capabilities via the Tartus navy base in Syria, allowing it to supply resources effectively into Libya5. More recently, the Wagner Group, led by General Andrei Averyanov, expanded Russia's "security for resources" initiative in Libya, reflecting the Kremlin's focus on turning Libya into a strategic advantage point for its wider African ambitions6.
In contrast, the US has had a limited and, at times, ineffectual influence in Libya. Though early attempts to engage with Libya were made in 2004 when Congress members visited and advocated for a better relationship7, these efforts have not resulted in a sustained, influential presence compared to Russia's ongoing initiatives. The top US military commander in Africa acknowledged in 2021 that Russia's growing influence in key regions like Libya poses a strategic concern8. However, without substantial US policy initiatives directly countering Russian movements, Libya remains more aligned to Russia, acting as a bridgehead for Russian support to sub-Saharan Africa910. The strategic use of Libya by Moscow outlines the broader geopolitical friction between Russian and American interests in the region surrounding Libya.
In contrast, the US has had a limited and, at times, ineffectual influence in Libya. Though early attempts to engage with Libya were made in 2004 when Congress members visited and advocated for a better relationship7, these efforts have not resulted in a sustained, influential presence compared to Russia's ongoing initiatives. The top US military commander in Africa acknowledged in 2021 that Russia's growing influence in key regions like Libya poses a strategic concern8. However, without substantial US policy initiatives directly countering Russian movements, Libya remains more aligned to Russia, acting as a bridgehead for Russian support to sub-Saharan Africa910. The strategic use of Libya by Moscow outlines the broader geopolitical friction between Russian and American interests in the region surrounding Libya.
4: Around the same time, in 2013, Russia established its Mediterranean Squadron, with its Black Sea Fleet mainly providing the necessary ships and logistics to gain a stronger foothold in the Middle East and North Africa. In 2015, the Russian military intervened in Syria and later began to support rebel commander Khalifa Haftar in the Libyan civil war. Since then, Russia has upgraded its previously modest Tartus naval base in Syria to accommodate larger ships, expanded its Hmeimim Air Base in Syria’s Latakia province and taken control of Libya’s Al Jufra Air Base — an important hub for the Kremlin’s Africa operations. View Source5: Analysts at Understanding War write that this base would be a logical continuation of Russia's military actions across the African continent. Owing to Russia's involvement in the Syrian civil war on the side of President Bashar Assad, the magazine reports that Russia already has a navy base in Tartus in southern Syria that it uses to send logistical supplies to Africa, and particularly Libya, which is also in the grips of a civil war. View Source6: Moscow is expanding its "security for resources" blueprint in Libya under the lead of the new Wagner Group's General Andrei Averyanov. What does this mean for the democratic transition? View Source7: Back at my apartment, I scan old Google Alerts for “Libya.” Four members of Congress traveled there in 2004, before the United States restored diplomatic relations. They tried to open the door to the West. I smile when I see that one of them was Solomon Ortiz. View Source8: The top US military commander in Africa told lawmakers in 2021 that a Russian naval base on the Red Sea was a key strategic concern with the potential to destabilize US interests across the continent. Even so, former US officials have said the country’s Sudan policy has largely failed to discourage Russia. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s last-ditch efforts to stop Russia from building closer ties with Sudan “only showed how out of touch we are,” a former State Department analyst told Middle East Eye. If US-aligned countries were “stepping up to help [Sudan’s Armed Forces], then we wouldn’t be talking about Russia now,” he added. View Source9: Libya, in turn, acts as a bridgehead for sending more support to countries in sub-Saharan Africa. View Source10: Libya, in turn, acts as a bridgehead for sending more support to countries in sub-Saharan Africa. View Source